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USSR-JAPAN: There are some signs that Moscow is seeking to exploit Tokyo's dissatisfaction with Washington's China policy and recent US economic moves.

Soviet diplomats have made predictable approaches to the Japanese in the last several weeks to suggest that closer Japan-USSR ties could counter improvements in US-China relations.

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The Soviets may also be encouraging Prime Minister Sato to accept a long-standing invitation to visit the USSR.

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Nevertheless, Japanese dismay over recent US actions has fostered reconsideration of Japan's dependence on Washington. Earlier this month, for example, an important member of Sato's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) publicly called for Sato to seek a "breakthrough" in foreign policy through a rapprochement with the USSR.

In order to make meaningful headway with the suspicious Japanese, however, Moscow will have to offer more than sympathy. While there has been no recent sign of Soviet flexibility on the territorial issue, Moscow may choose this time to offer some concessions on the contentious issue of Japanese

fishing in waters around the islands. Moscow's reception this week of the chief of the LDP policy committee may give some additional clues about how seriously Moscow intends to pursue better relations with Japan.

YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Belgrade appears to be warning the Kremlin not to expect easy talks or major concessions during the visit by party boss Brezhnev from 22 to 24 September.

25X1 [redacted] because Moscow initiated the visit, Belgrade has obtained promises of important concessions. Tito's negotiating position centers on demands to include in any communiqué a new bilateral agreement similar to the 1955 and 1956 Moscow declarations, which guaranteed Yugoslav sovereignty and the right of all Communist parties to pursue "different roads to socialism." Belgrade is also demanding cessation of hostile activity by Yugoslav emigres in the USSR and elsewhere.

Tito probably is skeptical that Brezhnev would abide by such concessions because they contradict Moscow's current pressure campaign against Belgrade. As a matter of fact, the Yugoslav party has flatly accused Moscow of directing and controlling the foreign policy of its allies--a tactic clearly indicating Yugoslav willingness to embarrass the other Eastern European regimes.

At present there is no hard information regarding Brezhnev's reasons for visiting Tito. He probably wants to assure Tito of his good intentions, block growing Chinese or other anti-Soviet influence in the Balkans, and to enlist Yugoslav support for new European agreements. Brezhnev will also want to discuss Belgrade's intentions regarding Tito's visit to the US in October. [redacted]

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GUYANA - COMMUNIST CHINA: Communist China has accepted Prime Minister Burnham's invitation to send a trade delegation to Georgetown to investigate the sale of Guyanese bauxite, and other products, to China. The presence of several representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that the Chinese may also sound out the Guyanese on prospects for diplomatic recognition.

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Initially a positive atmosphere for the delegation, which is expected to arrive tomorrow for a five-day visit, appears to be guaranteed by Burnham's public statement in June favoring replacement of the Republic of China by the PRC on the UN Security Council and by Burnham's eagerness to find markets for the output of the newly nationalized Guyana Bauxite Company.

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COMMUNIST CHINA - ALGERIA: Peking extended \$40 million in credit to Algiers during Foreign Minister Bouteflika's visit last month, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The new credit probably will be used to develop Algeria's textile industry, but a recent Algerian news release announced that Chinese technicians would arrive soon to study the possibility of constructing a dam to be financed by a new Chinese credit. It is not clear whether the new \$40 million aid includes \$25 million unused from a 1963 Chinese credit. [REDACTED]

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